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PRIVATE LAW
to be received a community asset if it were to be actually re-
ceived during marriage. The time for delivery or receipt of that
bargained for, in other words, should not itself be relevant if
that given for it is a performance during marriage under condi-
tions which would render the acquisition during marriage a com-
munity asset. The rule could not be applied justly, however, to
an asset received after divorce merely because it was received
pursuant to a contract entered into during marriage; it would
be incorrect, for example, to treat as a community asset the
remuneration received after divorce for services rendered there-
after merely because the services had been rendered pursuant
to a contract entered into during marriage.
8
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The principle that a third party cannot accept an offer ad-
dressed to another is recognized by the provisions of our Civil
Code.' The Code contains also a number of articles which deal
with error as to the person. In the first case there is an ab-
sence of consent; in the other, consent is given but is based on
error. The latter case arises when one deals with another under
a. mistaken belief in the other's identity or capacity. In Na-
tional Crankshaft Co. v. Natural Gas Industries, Inc.,2 the de-
fendant ordered a crankshaft from one supplier and it was sub-
sequently shipped by another who was a stranger to the trans-
8. Other decisions applying recognized solutions in community property cases
were: Glassell v. Dickerson, 159 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) applying
the rule that the purchase by the wife with separate funds becomes a community
asset, unless she can prove she purchased the item with separate funds with
intent to have it as separate asset; Cormier v. Billeaudeau, 159 So. 2d 780 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964) affirming that a partition after divorce can be translative
of ownership between parties even for land not specifically described; Harris v.
Harris, 160 So. 2d 359 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) affirming that only net income
from separate assets of husband falls into the community; Vining v. Beatty,
161 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) applying the rule of article 2386 as
amended by Acts 1944, No. 286 that fruits of the separate property of the wife
fall into the community unless she declares in writing that she reserves them for
her separate use and benefit; and Acremont v. Acremont, 162 So. 2d 813 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964) affirming that after divorce the community is dissolved and
husband and wife become co-owners in indivision.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1798, 1800 (1870).
2. 158 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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action. The court, finding that the crankshaft was installed by
defendant in certain oil field machinery without knowledge of
its source, and applying common law authority because the con-
tract had been formed in Texas, found no liability on the de-
fendant. There was one dissent on the basis of the articles of
the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with error as to the person
and also on the theory of unjust enrichment. If defendant never
intended to contract with plaintiff and did nothing to lead or
legally permit plaintiff so to believe, a contract would not arise,
nor would the articles relating to error as to the person apply.
Whether relief should have been granted on the theory of un-
just enrichment is another matter. In any event, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed the holding of the court
of appeal. Contrary to the appellate court, it found that before
the crankshaft was incorporated into the machinery an em-
ployee of the defendant and also its superintendent had received
information disclosing the identity of the shipper. Because of
this it was said that the "defendant had the choice either of ac-
cepting the goods, thereby implying a promise to pay and estab-
lishing a quasi contractual relationship, or of refusing them
under the theory that it had no contract with plaintiff. '' 3 A
finding of consent on the part of both parties, however, whether
express or implied, establishes a contract and precludes the ex-
istence of a quasi contract which does not rest on agreement
If use with knowledge had not been found, quasi contractual
recovery could have been properly allowed, pretermitting the
possibility that defendant might have lost a right of set-off
against the company to which the offer was given. 4
The admissibility of verbal testimony to show agreements
not contained in a writing signed by the contracting parties
continues to be involved in much doubt. Article 2276 of the
Civil Code, which is based on article 1341 of the Code Napoleon,
is far-reaching. It precludes any resort to testimonial proof
against or beyond the contents of a writing or of what may have
been said before, or at the time the writing was prepared, or
since. On the other hand, according to recognized common law
authority, since a writing cannot prove its own completeness,
parol evidence should always be admissible on the question of
whether a writing was intended by the parties as a final and
3. 246 La. 395, 165 So. 2d 1 (1964).
4. See 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 601 (1952 and Supp. 1964); 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 80 (1938).
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complete integration of their agreement." If this is affirma-
tively established, proof of any other agreement would be irrele-
vant; but if a contrary intention is proved, a collateral agree-
ment, whether made prior to or contemporaneously with the
agreement in writing, should be provable by writing or even
by oral testimony if a verbal agreement of the kind would be
enforceable. Our courts, understandably enough, have been con-
sistently inconsistent in dealing with the admissibility of parol
evidence beyond a written act. This is probably traceable to the
influence of the common law, the disquieting breadth of article
2276, and a softening attitude toward oral testimony. Although
the French rule reflects a grave distrust of testimony, it is dif-
ficult for a court to shut its eyes to the fact that in many cases
contracting parties do orally make agreements that go beyond
their written contract. Unless written proof is required in the
particular case, the urge to see justice done may turn the scale
in favor of giving recognition to a supplementary oral agree-
ment. Quite likely article 2276 is entirely too rigid to win sym-
pathetic application. Literally applied, it would preclude proof
of any verbal modification of an existing contract in writing.
Yet the Supreme Court succeeded in avoiding the adoption of
this view., Likewise, the number of cases in which oral testi-
mony has been received to prove agreements going beyond the
contents of a writing continues to mount.7 Since in apparent
disregard of article 2276 we have often permitted testimonial
proof of collateral agreements, it may be that we should un-
equivocally align ourselves in favor of this approach and adopt
the view that whenever it sufficiently appears the contracting
parties did not undertake to reduce their agreement in its en-
tirety to written form, testimonial proof of any supplementary
agreement would be admissible. Its sufficiency, of course,
would be a separate question to be resolved with proper regard
for the silence of the writing.8 Two recent cases emphasize the
5. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 582-584 (1952) ; WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2413,
.2430, 2431 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Salley v. Louviere, 183 La. 92, 162 So. 811 (1935).
7. Burton v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 152 So. 2d 235 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963), writ refused, 244 La. 895, 154 So. 2d 767 (1963) ; Tsoi v. Ebe-
nezer Baptist Church, 153 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). Civil Code
article 2276 prohibits "parol evidence." It does not preclude proof of collateral
agreements in writing. Collins v. Brunet, 239 La. 402, 118 So. 2d 454 (1960).
Yet in both cases there must be proof that the principal writing was not intended
to constitute the entire agreement. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 576 (1960).
8. "Have the parties, in assenting to it [the writing], excluded additional
terms even though they are not contradictory or inconsistent? Once more, the
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problem. The common law approach was taken in Carba v.
Maison Jolie, Inc.,9 and the court permitted verbal proof of a
contractor's agreement to pay a balance due on a lot upon which
the contractor had agreed in writing to build a home for the
owner. On the other hand, in Terrell v. Wright,'0 verbal proof
of an undertaking by the vendor of a lot to landscape it was
rejected. The former case relied on Davies v. Bierce"l and the
latter case on Davis v. Dees.12 Davies v. Bierce relied on com-
mon law authority; Davis v. Dees on article 2276. To follow the
common law may be more difficult than to stay within the
French tradition, but the approach is better designed to give ef-
fect to the whole agreement as consented to by the parties often
in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence which it might be
better to defend than to abuse.
In keeping with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
Smith v. Smith,13 the Third Circuit in Foster v. Smith14 permit-
ted a husband who had transferred property to his wife by way
of dation en paiement to set the transfer aside on the basis of
parol evidence which established the absence of any indebted-
ness. It would appear to be not contrary to established prin-
ciples to sustain such a transfer, as far as the transferor is con-
cerned, as a donation, assuming compliance with the formal re-
quirements and no other cause of nullity.15 A donation between
husband and wife is not a fraud on the law, and upholding on
this basis, as against the former, a transfer such as here made
would discourage resort to the dation en paiement device which,
as contrived, is in fraud of the law and may subsist as such if it
suits the husband's pleasure. The law adequately protects third
parties and could well afford to withhold its protection to a
party engaged in deceit.
document does not answer this question. But it may be answered with a high
degree of probability by the terms of the writing, the nature of the subject mat-
ter, the customs of men in such cases, and the testimony of witnesses. It is a
question of fact; no relevant evidence should be declared inadmissible, but the
flimsy and improbable should be treated as flimsy and improbable." 3 Coanri,
CONTRACTS 474-75 (1952).
9. 155 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
10. 161' So. 2d 103 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
11.. 114 La. 663, 38 So. 488 (1905).
12. 211 La. 229, 29 So. 2d 774 (1947).
13. 239 La. 688, 119 So. 2d 827 (1960).
14. 159 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
15. See Notes, 21 LA. L. REV. 680 (1961), 1 LA. L. REv. 213 (1938).
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. . The cases of Hayes v. Muller16 and Little v. Haik17 held parol
evidence inadmissible to prove a joint adventure contemplating
the acquisition of mineral interests, for the purpose of demand-
ing an accounting of proceeds so derived, but admissible in sup-
port of a claim for the recovery of funds advanced or on quan-
tum meruit for services rendered.'8
The proper classification of promises given in recognition
of services rendered by children to their parents is trouble-
some. Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has established that
there is always a presumption when such services are rendered
by a son or daughter to a parent that they are gratuitous and
the law will not allow compensation without proof of a promise
or expressed intention on the part of the parent to pay for
them.'9 In Laborde v. Dauzat20 a father gave his daughter a
note in the amount of $2,000.00 secured by a mortgage on an
immovable he owned. The court, finding that the services ren-
dered by the daughter were worth at least $1,000.00, said "the
conclusion must be reached that decedent received adequate con-
sideration for the note and mortgage. ' '2' There was no discus-
sion of the possibility that the note might have constituted a
remunerative donation. 22 If, instead of the note secured by a
mortgage, the father had given the land itself, valued at
$2,000.00, the problem here mentioned would clearly have arisen.
Does the holding afford an opportunity to give, beyond the reach
of the rules applicable to donations ?23
Largely on the authority of Equitable Real Estate Co. v. Na-
tional Surety Co.,24 the Third Circuit in Meaux v. Southern
Constr. Corp.25 gave judgment against a painting sub-contractor
for liquidated damages of $50.00 per day because the sub-con-
tractor had failed to give notice to the general contractor of the
cause of the delay within forty-eight hours as provided by the
16. 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191 (1963). This case is noted in this Review at
25 LA. L. REV. 277 (1964).
17. 246 La. 121, 163 So. 2d 558 (1964).
18. See also Pique v. Ingolia, 162 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), writ
refuaed, 164 So. 2d 361.
19. Farrar v. Johnson, 172 La. 30, 133 So. 352 (1931).
20. 158 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), writ rejused, 245 La. 731, 160
Bo.2d 595 (1964).
21. Id. at 644.
22. See Heirs of Cole v. Cole's Executors, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 414 (La. 1829).
23. See Comment, Personal Service8 About the Home, 23 LA. L. REV. 416,
446 (1963).
24. 133 La. 448, 63 So. 104 (1913).
25. 159 So. 2d 156 (1964), cert. denied, 245 La. 953, 162 So. 2d 9.
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sub-contract. The basis of decision seems undesirably rigid.
Although the Civil Code requires the courts to give the effect
of law to contracts as agreed upon by the parties, this principle
should not prevent proof of a subsequent waiver of such a notice
provision. The delays in question appear to have been caused by
other subcontractors, plus lack of supervision by the general
contractor. Indeed, it appears that the subcontractor could not
even begin some of the required work by the date stipulated for
completion. In addition, the failure to give notice was not relied
on in the contractor's brief in the trial court or when the appeal
was heard. The court reserved opinion on the question of
whether parol evidence is admissible in support of a claim for
extras not supported by written orders as provided in the writ-
ten contract. It was found that the plaintiff had failed to estab-
lish any such claim. In the later case of Roff v. Southern Constr.
Co. 26 the same court properly recognized the admissibility of
such evidence.
In Great American Indem. Co. v. Dauzat,27 a case of first
impression, it was held that the husband and the attorney of a
judgment creditor who received payment pending appeal were
not responsible to the judgment debtor for an overpayment re-
sulting from the reduction of the amount of the judgment on
appeal. The opinion contains a lengthy examination of Planiol's
Civil Law Treatise and follows the view therein expressed that
in such a case recovery should be allowed against only the party
to the suit which resulted in the judgment.
In Davis-Delcambre Motors, Inc. v. Simon 8 the Supreme
Court, reversing the court of appeal,29 found enforceable a prom-
issory note given by an employer to cover a worthless check
issued by his employee against the contention that it had been
given because of a threat of criminal prosecution. The court
found that the holder did not make a promise to suppress the
prosecution of the employee and that no threats, violence, or
pressure were exerted upon the employer. In addition, no evi-
dence was found to establish an intent by the employee to de-
fraud.
26. 163 So. 2d 112 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
27. 157 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
28. 246 La. 105, 163 So. 2d 553 (1964).
29. See 154 So. 2d 775 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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The practice of law is defined in La. R.S. 37:212. In Andrus
v. Guillot,30 a collection agency that engaged in the practice of
sending out notices to debtors and referring accounts to attor-
neys for collection on a split fee basis, was held to be practising
law in violation of this provision and not entitled to recover the
promised fee. In passing, the court observed that it was not
undertaking to "outlaw" collection agencies and indicated that,
although "peaceful collection or friendly adjustment" would not
constitute the practice of law, the collector cannot threaten with
legal proceedings or represent a creditor in court proceedings
either directly, or indirectly through an attorney engaged by
him.
To like effect, recovery was denied to an unlicensed person
who had engaged in a series of real estate transactions for
others on a fee basis over a period of time.31 The court dis-
tinguished Sheppard v. Hulseberg,32 where recovery was granted
to one who on an isolated occasion sold property for another for
a $100.00 fee. The court relied on La. R.S. 14:37 and 14:50.
In Abry Brothers v. Tillman33 the plaintiff contractor's ac-
ceptance of a post-dated check of a third party was held not to
constitute payment of the debt owed. The court found no agree-
ment, express or implied, to accept the checks in payment. In-
deed, there was clear evidence negativing any such intent. The
French are in accord.34
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
SALES
J. Denson Smith*
The Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari in the
case of Womack v. Sternberg.' The parties to an agreement for
an exchange of properties had affixed their signatures to two
30. 160 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
31. Maniscalco v. Glass, 163 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writre-
fused, 165 So. 2d 479.
32. 171 La. 659, 131 So. 840 (1930).
33. 245 La. 1017, 162 So. 2d 346 (1964).
34. See 12 HENRI, LON & JEAN MAZEAUD, LEgONS DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGA-
TiONS n* 1225 (1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 162 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
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